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Abstract
This paper investigates the global macroeconomic consequences of country-specic
oil-supply shocks. Our contribution is both theoretical and empirical. On the theo-
retical side, we develop a model for the global oil market and integrate this within a
compact quarterly model of the global economy to illustrate how our multi-country
approach to modelling oil markets can be used to identify country-specic oil-supply
shocks. On the empirical side, estimating the GVAR-Oil model for 27 countries/regions
over the period 1979Q2 to 2013Q1, we show that the global economic implications of
oil-supply shocks (due to, for instance, sanctions, wars, or natural disasters) vary con-
siderably depending on which country is subject to the shock. In particular, we nd
that adverse shocks to Iranian oil output are neutralized in terms of their e¤ects on
the global economy (real outputs and nancial markets) mainly due to an increase in
Saudi Arabian oil production. In contrast, a negative shock to oil supply in Saudi
Arabia leads to an immediate and permanent increase in oil prices, given that the loss
in Saudi Arabian production is not compensated for by the other oil producers. As a
result, a Saudi Arabian oil supply shock has signicant adverse e¤ects for the global
economy with real GDP falling in both advanced and emerging economies, and large
losses in real equity prices worldwide.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the economic consequences of country-specic oil supply shocks for
the global economy in terms of their impacts on real output, oil prices and nancial markets.
It complements the extensive literature that exists on the e¤ects of shocks to the aggregate
oil supply in the world economy. See, for example, Kilian (2008b, 2009), Hamilton (2009),
and Cashin et al. (2014). An analysis of the e¤ects of country-specic oil supply shocks
is required to answer counterfactual questions regarding the possible macroeconomic e¤ects
of oil sanctions, or region-specic supply disruptions due to wars or natural disasters.1 To
this end, we rst develop a model of the global oil market and derive an oil price equation
which takes account of developments in the world economy as well as the prevailing oil
supply conditions. We then integrate this within a compact quarterly model of the global
economy comprising 27 countries, with the euro area being treated as a single economy,
using a dynamic multi-country framework rst advanced by Pesaran et al. (2004), known as
the Global VAR (or GVAR for short). This approach allows us to analyze the international
macroeconomic transmission of the e¤ects of country-specic oil supply shocks, taking into
account not only the direct exposure of countries to the shocks but also the indirect e¤ects
through secondary or tertiary channels.
The individual country-specic models are solved in a global setting where core macro-
economic variables of each economy (real GDP, ination, real exchange rate, short and
long-term interest rates, and oil production) are related to corresponding foreign variables,
(also known as "star" variables) constructed to match the international trade pattern of the
country under consideration. Star variables serve as proxies for common unobserved factors
and a¤ect the global economy in addition to the set of common observable variables (oil
prices and global equity prices). We estimate the 27 country-specic vector autoregressive
models with foreign variables (VARX* models) over the period 1979Q2 to 2013Q1 separately
and then combine these with the estimates from the global oil market, which we refer to as
the GVAR-Oil model. The combined model is used for a number of counterfactual exercises.
In particular, we examine the direct and indirect e¤ects of shocks to Iranian and Saudi Ara-
bian oil output on the world economy, on a country-by-country basis, and provide the time
prole of the e¤ects of country-specic oil shocks on oil prices, real outputs across countries,
and real equity prices.
The paper also makes a theoretical contribution to the analysis of oil shocks. In particular,
we propose a new scheme for identication of country-specic supply shocks based on the
1See Hamilton (2013) for the history of the oil industry with a particular focus on oil shocks. On historical
oil shocks, see also Kilian (2008b) and Kilian and Murphy (2014).
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assumption that changes in an individual countrys oil production are unimportant relative
to changes in the world oil supplies, and as a result the correlation of oil prices and country-
specic oil supply shocks tends to zero for a su¢ ciently large number of oil producers. We
show that such an identication procedure is applicable even if the country-specic oil supply
shocks are weakly correlated, in the sense dened by Chudik et al. (2011).2 To allow for
the possible cross-country oil supply spillover e¤ects we make use of structural generalized
impulse response functions based on historically estimated covariances of the country-specic
oil supply shocks. Our identication approach di¤ers from the literature, which considers
identication of global supply shocks typically by imposing sign restrictions on the structural
parameters of a three equation VAR model in oil prices, world real output, and global oil
production. See, for instance, Kilian and Murphy (2012, 2014), Baumeister and Peersman
(2013b), and Cashin et al. (2014).
Our ndings suggest that a one-standard-error adverse shock to Iranian oil output, equiv-
alent to a fall in the Iranian oil supply of around 16% in the rst four quarters, is neutralized
in terms of its e¤ects on the global economy. This is mainly due to an increase in Saudi
Arabian oil production to compensate for the loss in OPEC supply and to stabilize the oil
markets, which is borne out by the recent episode of oil sanctions against Iran by the U.S.
and European countries. This outcome is made possible due to the large Saudi Arabian
spare capacity, which allows it to act as a swing producer at the global level. However, a
negative shock to Iranian oil supply does lead to a fall in Iranian real output of around 6%
in the short-run, and rebounds somewhat ending with a drop in real output of around 3:5%
over the long run, as the Iranian economy adjusts to the new reduced level of oil income.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia tends to benet from a negative shock to Iranian oil production. In
the long run Saudi real output increases by 3:1% in response to the negative shock to Irans
oil output.
In contrast, a one-standard-error adverse shock to oil production in Saudi Arabia (around
11% per quarter) has far-reaching implications for oil markets and the global economy. A
Saudi negative oil supply shock causes oil prices to rise substantially and reach 22% above
their pre-shock levels in the long run. This is not surprising, given that most of the other
oil exporters are producing at (or near) capacity and cannot increase their production to
compensate for the loss in Saudi Arabian oil supply. As a result, the shock to Saudi oil
output has signicant e¤ects for the global economy not only in terms of real output, which
falls in both advanced (including the U.K. and the U.S.) and emerging economies, but also
in terms of nancial markets as global real equity prices fall by around 9% in the long run.
2The country-specic oil supply shocks, vit, for i = 1; 2; :::; N , are said to be cross-sectionally weakly
correlated if supj
PN
i=1 jcov(vit; vjt)j < K <1 for all N .
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While there is a large body of literature investigating the e¤ects of oil shocks on the
macroeconomy, most studies have focused on a handful of industrialized/OECD countries
with the analysis being mainly done in isolation from the rest of the world. Although some of
these papers aim to identify the underlying source of the oil shock (demand versus supply),
most of these oil-price shocks are taken to be global in nature rather than originating from a
particular oil-producing country (or region). Moreover, the focus of the literature has been
predominantly on net oil importers. See, for example, Hamilton (2003, 2009), Kilian (2008a,
2008b), Blanchard and Gali (2009), and Peersman and Van Robays (2012). In fact, in the
majority of cases these studies have looked at the impact of oil shocks exclusively on the
United States, as in Kilian (2009), who using a structural VAR model, decomposes oil-price
shocks into three types: global oil-supply shock, global oil-demand shock driven by economic
activity, and an oil-specic demand shock driven by expectations about future changes in
global oil market conditions.
More recently, however, a number of papers have examined the e¤ects of oil shocks on
major oil exporters (located in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America) as well as many
emerging and developing countries. For instance, Esfahani et al. (2014), conducting a
country-by-country VARX* analysis, investigate the direct e¤ects of oil-revenue shocks on
domestic output for nine major oil exporters, of which six are OPEC members (Iran, Kuwait,
Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela), one is a former OPEC member (Indonesia),
and the remaining two are OECD oil exporters (Mexico and Norway).3 Kilian et al. (2009)
examine the e¤ects of di¤erent types of oil-price shocks on the external balances of net oil
exporters/importers. Finally, Cashin et al. (2014) employ a set of sign restrictions on the
impulse responses of a GVAR model, as well as bounds on impact price elasticities of oil
supply and oil demand, to discriminate between supply-driven and demand-driven global
oil-price shocks, and to study the time prole of their macroeconomic e¤ects across a wide
range of countries and variables.4
In this paper, we extend the literature in a number of respects. Firstly, we model global
oil markets separately from the country-specic VARX* models, by specifying an oil price
equation which takes account of global demand conditions as well as oil supply conditions
across some of the major oil producing countries. Secondly, we illustrate how the multi-
country approach to modelling oil markets can be used to identify country-specic oil-supply
shocks. Thirdly, by including oil supplies in the country-specic models for the oil producing
countries we are able to identify and investigate not only the implications of country-specic
3Chapter 4 of International Monetary Fund (2012) provides a discussion of the e¤ects of commodity price
shocks on commodity exporters, using the methodology in Kilian (2009).
4See also Cavalcanti et al. (2011a, 2011b, 2014) for recent panel studies taking into account cross-country
heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependence.
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oil supply shocks on the global economy in terms of real GDP, but also their e¤ects on global
nancial markets and oil prices. This is in contrast to most of the literature that focuses on
the identication of global supply shocks, rather than shocks to a specic country or region.
Finally, given the importance of U.S. equity markets in global nance, we model global
nancial markets within the United States VARX* model, thus explicitly using the U.S.
model as a transmission mechanism for identifying the e¤ects of oil supply shocks on real
equity prices, and the second round e¤ects of changes in real equity prices on real outputs
and oil prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines a multi-country
approach for identication of country-specic oil supply shocks. Section 3 develops a model
for global oil markets and integrates it within a compact quarterly model of the global
economy. Section 4 provides estimates of the GVAR-Oil model, namely the oil price equation
and country-specic VARX* models inclusive of country-specic oil supply equations. In
Section 5 the GVAR-Oil model is used to investigate the global macroeconomic consequences
of adverse shocks to Iranian and Saudi Arabian oil supplies. Finally, Section 6 o¤ers some
concluding remarks.
2 Identication of country-specic oil supply shocks
In this section we abstract from dynamics, common factors and nancial variables and con-
sider the simultaneous determination of the oil price, pot , aggregate oil supply, q
o
t , and real
world income, yt, by the following three equations
pot = yt + q
o
t + u
o
t ; (1)
qot =  p
o
t + 'yt + vt; (2)
yt = p
o
t + q
o
t + "t; (3)
where uot , vt, and "t are the "structural" shocks, which are assumed to be uncorrelated. As
is well known, in this unrestricted formulation the structural parameters, , ,  , ', , and
, and hence the structural shocks, are not identied. In the literature the oil supply and
demand shocks are identied using a structural VAR approach, in some cases making use of a
priori sign restrictions. See, for instance, Baumeister and Peersman (2013a, 2013b), Cashin
et al. (2014), Chudik and Fidora (2012), Kilian (2009), Kilian and Murphy (2012, 2014),
and Peersman and Van Robays (2012). However, this approach only helps in identifying
global supply shocks rather than shocks originating from a particular country or a region.
To consider identication of country-specic oil supply shocks, we utilize a multi-country
4
framework where we assume that qot and yt are aggregates over a large number of countries.
To this end we suppose that
yt =
NX
i=1
wiyit; (4)
qot =
NX
i=1
woi q
o
it; (5)
where yit and qoit are the real income and quantity of oil output of country i at time t;
respectively, and wi and woi are the weights attached to country i
0s real income and oil
production in the construction of the world GDP and oil supply. Moreover, we assume that
the individual country contributions to yt and qot are of order 1=N , and in particular the
weights, wi and woi , satisfy the following granularity conditions
kwk = O

N 
1
2

, (6)
wi
kwk = O

N 
1
2

for all i, (7)
where w = (w1; w2; :::; wN)
0, or wo = (wo1; w
o
2; :::; w
o
N)
0, are N  1 vectors of weights.
We now replace equations (2) and (3) with the following disaggregated system of equa-
tions:
qoit =  ip
o
t + 'iyit + vit, for i = 1; 2; :::; N , (8)
yit = ip
o
t + iq
o
it + "it, for i = 1; 2; :::; N , (9)
where vt = (v1t; v2t; :::; vNt)0 and "t = ("1t; "2t; :::; "Nt)0 are N  1 vectors of country-specic
oil supply and real income shocks. For simplicity of exposition we are abstracting from the
e¤ects of exchange rates and domestic prices on oil demand. One could also allow for the
e¤ects of technological changes on the oil supply conditions in the above model, but such
extensions do not a¤ect our analysis of identication of oil supply shocks so long as the
additional factors are uncorrelated with vit. The same argument can also be made with
regard to the real output equation, (9). Furthermore, as it is done in the case of the GVAR-
Oil specication in Section 3, individual real output equations can be considered as a part of
country-specic VAR or VARX* models where other variables such as interest rates, ination
and exchange rates are also included in the analysis. But for the purpose of identication of
oil supply shocks, vt, we abstract from such complications.
Along with the literature, we assume that the oil demand shock, uot , the oil supply shocks,
5
vt, and real income shocks, "t, are uncorrelated, but allow the oil supply shocks (and real
income shocks) to be cross-sectionally weakly correlated. This is formalized in the following
assumption.
Assumption 1: Consider theN country-specic oil supply shocks, vt = (v1t; v2t; :::; vNt)0,
the N country-specic real output shocks, "t = ("1t; "2t; :::; "Nt)0, and the oil demand shock,
u0t , dened by equations (1), (8) and (9), respectively, and let E(vtv
0
t) = vv and E("t"
0
t) =
"". Suppose that
E (uotvt) = 0, E (u
o
t"t) = 0; E(vt"
0
t) = 0; E

(uot )
2 < K <1;
max (vv) < K <1, and max ("") < K <1;
where max(A) denotes the largest eigenvalue of matrix A.
Assumption 2: The coe¢ cients in (8) and (9) are bounded in N , namely
j ij < K <1; j'ij < K <1; jij < K <1; jij < K <1:
Also
1  'ii 6= 0, for all i,
and 1   N   oN 6= 0, where N and oN are dened by (12) and (13) below, for all N
and as N !1:
We are now ready to investigate the conditions under which p0t can be treated as (weakly)
exogenous, and country-specic supply shocks identied. To this end, solving for qoit and yit
in terms of pot we have
qoit =

 i + 'ii
1  'ii

pot +

1
1  'ii

(vit + 'i"it) ; (10)
yit =

i i + i
1  'ii

pot +

1
1  'ii

(ivit + "it) : (11)
Aggregating over i = 1; 2; :::; N and using equations (4) and (5) we obtain
yt = Np
o
t + vNt + "Nt;
qot = 
o
Np
o
t + v
o
Nt + "
o
Nt;
where
N =
NX
i=1
wi

i i + i
1  'ii

; vNt =
NX
i=1
wi

ivit
1  'ii

; "Nt =
NX
i=1
wi

"it
1  'ii

; (12)
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and
oN =
NX
i=1
woi

 i + 'ii
1  'ii

; voNt =
NX
i=1
woi

vit
1  'ii

; "oNt =
NX
i=1
woi

'i"it
1  'ii

: (13)
Using these results in equation (1) we now have
pot =
uot +  (vNt + "Nt) +  (v
o
Nt + "
o
Nt)
(1  N   oN)
: (14)
It is clear that E (potvit) 6= 0 and E (pot"it) 6= 0, when N is nite, and as a result OLS
regressions of qit on p0t and yit will not yield consistent estimates of the oil supply shocks.
But writing vNt as vNt = w0vt where w = (w11; w22; :::; wNN)
0, we note that under
Assumption 1 E (vNt) = 0, and
V ar (vNt) = w
0
vvw w0wmax (vv) :
Therefore, under Assumption 2 and the granularity condition (6), we obtain
w0w =
NX
i=1
2iw
2
i  sup
i
(2i ) kwk2 = O
 
N 1

:
Hence, vNt = Op
 
N 1=2

. Similarly, it follows that voNt = Op
 
N 1=2

, "Nt = Op
 
N 1=2

,
and "oNt = Op
 
N 1=2

, and noting that by assumption (1  N   oN) 6= 0, then
pot =
uot
(1  N   oN)
+Op
 
N 1=2

:
Therefore, under the standard assumption that the oil demand shock (uot ) and the country-
specic oil supply shocks (vit) are uncorrelated we have Cov (pot ; vit) = Op
 
N 1=2

, for all
i. Similarly, under the assumption that the oil demand shock and country-specic income
shocks are uncorrelated we also have Cov (pot ; "it) = Op
 
N 1=2

, for all i. These results
establish that when N is su¢ ciently large and the granularity condition (6) is met, oil prices
can be treated as exogenous in individual country oil supply and income equations. The
granularity condition is likely to hold for all oil producers considered in the empirical section
4, with the possible exception of Saudi Arabia. In the empirical application we use weak
exogeneity tests to check the validity of our maintained assumption that oil prices can be
treated as exogenous in country-specic oil supply equations.
To identify oil supply shocks, vit, further restrictions are needed. But, given the global
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role played by the multi-national oil companies in exploration, development and production
of oil across many countries, it is reasonable to assume that oil supply in individual countries
are determined by the availability of oil reserves and geopolitical factors rather than country-
specic real incomes. This suggests setting 'i = 0. Under this restriction vit can be identied
by OLS regression of qit on pot . In the case of the more general set up used in the empirical
application we consider the inclusion of other variables (such interest rates) in the country-
specic oil supply equations which could be important in capturing the inter-temporal aspects
of the oil supply process as well.
3 The GVAR-Oil model
We now introduce deterministics, common factors and dynamics in the multi-country model.
For the oil price equation we consider the general dynamic aggregate demand function for
oil given by
qotd = ad + yay(L)yt   poap(L)~pot + "dt; (15)
where qotd is the logarithm of world demand for oil, yt is a measure of world real income
(in logs), ~pot is the logarithm of real oil prices, ad is a xed constant, ay(L) and ap(L) are
polynomials in the lag operator, L, whose coe¢ cients add up to unity, namely
ay(L) = ay0 + ay1L+ ay2L
2 + :::
ap(L) = ap0 + ap1L+ ap2L
2 + :::
with ay(1) = ap(1) = 1. Hence, y > 0 is the long-run income elasticity of demand for oil
and po > 0 is the long-run price elasticity of demand for oil. We further assume that oil
prices adjust to the gap between demand and supply of oil as specied by
~pot = as + (q
o
td   qot ) + "st; (16)
where measures the speed of the adjustment, as is a xed constant that captures the scarcity
value of oil, and "st represents speculative oil price changes not related to the fundamental
factors that drive oil demand and supply. The intercept as could be a function of the interest
rate as predicted by the Hotelling (1931) model. Combining the above two equations we
obtain
~pot = as +  [ad + yay(L)yt   poap(L)~pot + "dt]  qot + "st;
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or
~pot = ap + yay(L)yt   poap(L)~pot   qot + "pt; (17)
where
ap = as + ad; and "pt = "dt + "st:
Using (17) we can now solve for pot to obtain
~pot =

1
1 + poap0

ap +

1  poap1
1 + poap0

~pot 1  

po
1 + poap0
 1X
`=2
ap`epot `
+

y
1 + poap0

ay(L)yt  


1 + poap0

qot +

1
1 + poap0

"pt; (18)
which is a standard autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model in oil prices, world real
income and world oil supplies. It is easily established that the above specication reduces
to (1) if we set ap = 0 and abstract from the dynamics.
To analyze the international macroeconomic transmission of country-specic oil supply
shocks, we now need to integrate the oil price equation (18) within a compact quarterly
model of the global economy. To this end we utilize the Global VAR (GVAR) framework,
which is a dynamic multi-country framework able to account not only for direct exposures of
countries to oil shocks but also indirect e¤ects through third markets, originally proposed by
Pesaran et al. (2004) and further developed by Dees et al. (2007). To simplify the exposition
we set all lag orders to unity and consider the simple dynamic oil price equation (we consider
more general dynamics in the empirical application in Section 4.1)
~pot = cp + 1~p
o
t 1 + 1yt 1 + 1q
o
t 1 + u
o
t ; (19)
where ~pot is the weighted average of country-specic log real oil prices, dened by
~pot =
NX
i=1
!i~p
o
it; (20)
~poit = ln (P
o
t Eit=Pit) = p
o
t + (eit   pit) ; (21)
P ot is the nominal price of oil in US dollar, Eit is country i
th exchange rate measured by
the units of country ith currency in one US dollar, and Pit is the general level of prices in
country i. The above decomposition of country-specic real oil prices into the US dollar
price component and the "real" exchange rate component (here dened by epit = eit   pit)
is important, since only the US dollar oil price component, pot , can be regarded as weakly
9
exogenous. The real exchange rate component, epit, is determined endogenously with the
other variables in the country-specic models, such as interest rates and real output.
Also to integrate the oil price equation within a multi-country set-up we need to write the
oil price equation in terms of pot . To this end using (21) in (20) we rst note that ~p
o
t = p
o
t +ept,
where5
ept =
NX
i=1
!iepit: (22)
Using this result the oil price equation can be written as
pot + ept = cp + 1
 
pot 1 + ept 1

+ 1yt 1 + 1q
o
t 1 + u
o
t : (23)
where as before we also have (see (4) and (5)),
yt =
NX
i=1
!iyit; and qot =
NX
i=1
!oi q
o
it: (24)
In our multi-country set-up, the country-specic variables, epit; yit and qoit , are determined
jointly with the other macro variables using the GVAR framework. Specically, we consider
the following country-specic models (for i = 1; 2; :::; N)
xit = ai0 + ai1t+ ixi;t 1 + i0xit + i1x

i;t 1 + i0p
o
t + i1p
o
t 1 + uit; (25)
where ai0; ai1;i;i0;i1;i0;and i1 are vectors/matrices of xed coe¢ cients that vary
across countries, xit is ki  1 vector of country-specic endogenous variables that include
epit; yit, and qoit (as applicable), and x

it is k

i  1 vector of country-specic weakly exogenous
(or starvariables). The starvariables, xit, are constructed using country-specic trade
shares, and dened by
xit =
NX
j=1
wijxjt; (26)
where wij; i; j = 1; 2; :::N; are bilateral trade weights, with wii = 0; and
PN
j=1wij = 1.
6
The country-specic VARX* models, (25), are combined with the oil price equation, (23),
5In the literature, the real oil price is typically computed by deating the nominal oil price with the US
general price index. But as our analysis shows, for global analysis such a procedure is not valid unless the
law of one price holds universally, namely if EitPUS;t = Pit for all i. Only under such stringent conditions it
follows that ~pot = p
o
t +
PN
i=1 !i ln (Eit=Pit) = p
o
t +
PN
i=1 !i ln (1=PUS;t) = p
o
t   pUS;t.
6The main justication for using bilateral trade weights, as opposed to nancial weights for instance,
is that the former have been shown to be the most important determinant of national business cycle co-
movements. See Baxter and Kouparitsas (2005), among others.
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and solved for all the endogenous variables collected in the vector, zt = (pot ;x
0
1t;x
0
2t; :::;x
0
Nt)
0 =
(pot ;x
0
t)
0, We refer to this combined model as the GVAR-Oil model, which allows for a two-
way linkage between the global economy and oil prices. Changes in the global economic
conditions and oil supplies a¤ect oil prices with a lag, with oil prices potentially inuencing
all country-specic variables. Similarly, changes in oil supplies, determined in country mod-
els for the major oil producers, are a¤ected by oil prices and in turn a¤ect oil prices with a
lag as specied in the oil price equation, (23).
Although estimation is carried out on a country-by-country basis, the GVAR model is
solved for oil prices and all country variables simultaneously, taking account of the fact
that all variables are endogenous to the system as a whole. To solve for the endogenous
variables, zt, using (26) we rst note that xit = Wixt, where Wi is a k

i  (k + 1), matrix
of xed constants (which are either 0 or 1 or some pre-specied weights, wij), k =
PN
i=1 ki,
ki = dim(x

it). Stacking the country-specic models we now have
xt = 't + xt 1 + H0xt + H1xt 1 + 0p
o
t + 1p
o
t 1 + ut;
where
 =
0BBBB@
1 0    0
0 2    0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0    N
1CCCCA ; H0 =
0BBBB@
10W1
20W2
...
N0WN
1CCCCA , H1 =
0BBBB@
11W1
21W2
...
N1WN
1CCCCA ,
't =
0BBBB@
a10 + a11t
a20 + a21t
...
aN0 + aN1t
1CCCCA , 0 =
0BBBB@
10
20
...
N0
1CCCCA , 1 =
0BBBB@
11
21
...
N1
1CCCCA , ut =
0BBBB@
u1t
u2t
...
uNt
1CCCCA ;
We also note that the oil price equation (23) can be written as
pot + w
0
epxt = cp + 1
 
pot 1 + w
0
epxt 1

+
 
1w
0
y + 1w
0
q

xt 1 + uot ;
where wep, wy and wq are k 1 vectors whose elements are either zero or is set equal to the
weights wi or w0i , assigned to epit, yit or q
o
it, as implied by (22), (4), and (5), respectively.
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Combining the above oil price equation with the country specic models we obtain 
1 w0ep
 0 Ik  H0
! 
pot
xt
!
=
 
cp
't
!
+
 
1 1w
0
ep+1w
0
y + 1w
0
q
1  + H1
! 
pot 1
xt 1
!
+
 
uot
ut
!
;
(27)
which can be written more compactly as
G0zt = bt + G1zt 1 + vt:
Under the assumption that Ik   H0 is invertible the GVAR-Oil model has the following
reduced form solution:
zt = at + Fzt 1 + t; (28)
where
at = G
 1
0 bt; F = G
 1
0 G1; t = G
 1
0 vt:
3.1 Structural impulse responses for country-specic oil supply
shocks
The reduced form solution, (28) can now be used in forecasting or for counterfactual analysis.
The focus of our analysis is on the counterfactual e¤ects of country-specic oil supply shocks.
In particular, we are interested in the consequences of shocks to Iranian and Saudi Arabian
oil supplies. To this end we consider the following structuralversion of (28),
Qzt = Qat + QFzt 1 + "t; (29)
where "t = Qt = ("1t; "2t; ::::; "k+1;t)
0 are the structural shocks, and Q is a (k + 1) (k + 1)
non-singular matrix. In a multi-country context due to spill-over e¤ects across countries we
need to allow for the possibility that some of the structural shocks might be correlated. To
allow for non-zero correlations across the structural shocks we use the generalized impulse
response function developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998). For model (29), the impulse
response function of a unit shock to the ith structural error, "it, is given by
gz(h; i) = E (zt+h js0i"t = i; It 1 )  E (zt+h jIt 1 ) ; for h = 0; 1; :::
where si is a (k + 1) 1 vector of zeros with the exception of its ith element which is set to
unity, i denotes the size of the shock, and It 1 = (zt 1; zt 2; ::::). Using (29) we have (note
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that at is non-stochastic)
gz(h; i) = F
hgz(h  1; i), for h = 1; 2; :::; (30)
gz(0; i) = Q
 1E ("t js0i"t = i; It 1 ) =  1i Q 1""si:
But "" = QQ
0, where  = E (t
0
t) and can be identied from the reduced form of
the GVAR-Oil model given by (28). Using this result we now have
gz(0; i) = 
 1
i Q
0si: (31)
Therefore, to identify the e¤ects of the structural shocks we need to identifyQ0si which is the
ith row of Q. To identify all the structural shocks (and without imposing any restrictions
on "") it is clear that we must set Q equal to an identity matrix. But if the aim is to
identify the impulse response functions of some but not all of the structural shocks one
needs only to focus on those rows of Q that relate to structural shocks of interest. In the
present application where our focus is on country-specic oil supply shocks, we consider the
following partitions of Q and "t
Q =
 
Qaa Qab
Qba Qbb
!
, and "t =
 
"at
"bt
!
;
where "at = (pot ; q
o
1t; q
o
2t; :::; q
o
Nt)
0, with the rest of the structural shocks included in "bt. To
identify the e¤ects of "at we assume that Qab = 0, and
Qaa =
0BBBBBBB@
1 0    0 0
o1 1    0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
oN 1 0 0 1 0
oN 0 0 0 1
1CCCCCCCA
;
which is in line with the theoretical restrictions derived in Section 2. This specication
allows oil price changes to contemporaneously a¤ect country-specic oil supplies but not the
reverse.
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4 Empirical application
We begin our empirical investigation with estimates of the oil price equation and discuss its
robustness along several dimensions. We include as many major oil producers as possible in
our multi-country set up, subject to data availability, together with as many countries in the
world to represent the global economy. The model includes 34 economies, which together
cover more than 90% of world GDP. Out of these, ten are classied as "major oil producers",
i.e. countries producing more than one percent of total world oil supply according to 2004-
2013 averages (Table 1). The ve major oil exporters, Canada, Iran, Mexico, Norway,
and Saudi Arabia, clearly satisfy this condition, as does the UK, which remained a net oil
exporter until 2006, and Indonesia, which was an OPEC member until January 2009. In
addition, there are three other countries in our sample which produce signicantly more than
2.4 million barrels per day (mbd): Brazil, China, and the U.S. (Table 2). Although net oil
importers, these countries are the eleventh, fourth, and second largest oil producers in the
world, respectively.
Table 1: Countries and Regions in the GVAR Model
Major Oil Producers Other Countries
Net Exporters Europe Asia Pacic
Canada Euro Area Australia
Indonesia Austria India
Iran Belgium Japan
Mexico Finland Korea
Norway France Malaysia
Saudi Arabia Germany New Zealand
Italy Philippines
Net Importers Netherlands Singapore
Brazil Spain Thailand
China Sweden
United Kingdom Switzerland
United States Latin America
Rest of the World Argentina
South Africa Chile
Turkey Peru
Unfortunately, we are not able to include Iraq (ranked fth in the world in terms of proven
oil reserves) in our sample due to lack of su¢ ciently long time series data for this country.
This was also the case for Russia, the third largest oil producer in the world, for which
quarterly observations are not available for the majority of our sample period although, as
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Table 2: Oil Reserves, Production and Exports of Major Oil Producers, averages
over 20042013
Country Oil Production Oil Exports Oil Reserves
Million Percent Million Percent Billion Percent
Barrels/day of World Barrels/day of World Barrels of World
Net Exporters
Canada 3.5 4.0 1.5 3.7 177.0 11.7
Indonesia 1.1 1.2 0.3 0.8 4.0 0.3
Iran 4.0 4.7 2.4 5.8 144.1 9.5
Mexico 3.3 3.8 1.6 4.0 12.3 0.8
Norway 2.4 2.8 1.8 4.5 8.2 0.5
Saudi Arabia 10.8 12.6 7.1 17.2 264.7 17.5
Net Importers
Brazil 2.4 2.8 - - 13.4 0.9
China 4.1 4.7 - - 16.5 1.1
United Kingdom 1.5 1.7 - - 3.3 0.2
United States 9.5 11.0 - - 34.2 2.3
World 86.3 100.00 41.1 100.0 1510.3 100.00
Source: Oil production data are from the U.S. Energy Information Administration International Energy
Statistics, oil reserve data are from the British Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy and oil export
data are from the OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin.
Table 3: PPP-GDP Weights (in percent), averages over 20072009
Country PPP GDP Country PPP GDP Country PPP GDP
Weights (wi) Weights (wi) Weights (wi)
Argentina 0.99 Iran 1.43 South Africa 0.88
Australia 1.42 Japan 7.47 Saudi Arabia 1.02
Brazil 3.44 Korea 2.28 Singapore 0.44
Canada 2.25 Malaysia 0.67 Sweden 0.62
China 14.49 Mexico 2.75 Switzerland 0.60
Chile 0.42 Norway 0.48 Thailand 0.95
Euro Area 17.86 New Zealand 0.22 Turkey 1.79
India 6.15 Peru 0.42 UK 3.87
Indonesia 1.60 Philippines 0.55 USA 24.93
Notes: The euro area block includes 8 of the 11 countries that initially joined the euro on January 1, 1999:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. Source: World Bank World
Development Indicators, 2007-2009.
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discussed below, we do consider the robustness of the estimates of the oil price equation to
the inclusion of Russia, using a somewhat shorter period.
The ten major oil producers have one important feature in common, namely that the
amount of oil they produce on any given day plays a signicant role in the global oil markets,
however, they di¤er considerably from each other in terms of how much oil they produce
(and export), their level of proven oil reserves, as well as their spare capacity (Table 2).7 In
particular, we note from Table 2 that although Iran has substantial reserves (4th largest in
the world) its production is less than 5% of the world oil output, being similar to that of
China (with only around 1% of the worlds known reserves). What might be surprising is
that Canada has in fact larger oil reserves than Iran but exports around 1 million barrels
per day less than Iran.
Table 2 also shows that Saudi Arabia plays a key role when it comes to world oil supply.
Not only does it produce more than 12:6% of world oil output and owns 17:5% of the worlds
proven oil reserves, it also exports around 17:2% of the world total, which is almost the
same amount as the other four major oil exporters in our sample combined. Moreover, Saudi
Arabia is not only the largest oil producer and exporter in the world, but it also has the largest
spare capacity and as such is often seen as a "swing" producer. For example, following the
Arab spring and the recent oil sanctions on Iran, Saudi Arabia has increased its production
to stabilize the global oil markets. Therefore, one would expect that disruptions to global
oil supplies would be compensated by an increase in Saudi Arabian oil production, whilst
disruptions to Saudi Arabian oil supply could potentially only be partially compensated by
other producers given that most of them are producing at (or near) capacity.
Based on the country composition set out in Table 1, we computed ept and yt dened
by (22) and (24) using PPP-GDP weights. Specically, ept =
PN
i=1wi ln (Eit=CPIit), and
yt =
PN
i=1wi ln(GDPit); where Eit is the US dollar exchange rate, CPIit is the consumer
price index and, GDPit is the real GDP of country i at time t, i = 1; 2; :::N; and wi is the
PPP-GDP weight of country i; with
PN
i=0wi = 1.
8 We compute wi as a three-year averages
over 2007-2009 to reduce the impact of individual yearly movements on the weights. See
Table 3 for the weights of each of the 26 countries and the euro area. For global oil supply,
7Note that proven reserves at any given point in time are dened as "quantities of oil that geological
and engineering information indicate with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known
reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions" (British Petroleum Statistical Review of World
Energy), thus this measure could be uncertain.
8The PPP-GDP weights are based on data from the World BankWorld Development Indicator database.
Data on real GDP, yit, over the period 1979Q2 to 2013Q1, for all countries but Iran, are obtained from Smith
and Galesi (2014). GDP data for Iran over the period 1979Q1-2006Q4 are from Esfahani et al. (2014), which
were updated using the International Monetary Funds (IMF) International Financial Statistics and World
Economic Outlook databases. See also the Data Appendix A for further details.
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we use qot =
PN
i=1w
o
i q
o
it, where q
o
it = 0 for the euro area and the 16 countries that are not
major oil producers (see Table 1 for the list of major oil producers).9 We considered both
production and exports in deciding the weights woi , but found that neither gave a satisfactory
result. For example, basing the weights on oil exports amounts to setting woUS = 0, despite
the fact that US is producing around 11% of world oil output. Alternatively, using oil
production to dene woi understates the importance of marginal changes in oil exports on oil
prices. Given the extensive nature of international trade in oil we decided to adopt an equal
weight scenario which places the same weights on relative changes of oil outputs across all
the major oil producers. Finally, pot = ln(P
o
t ), where P
o
t is measured by the price of Brent
crude oil in US dollars.
4.1 Estimates of the oil price equation
Having constructed the series for ept, yt and qot , we estimated the oil price equation (23)
allowing for more general dynamics using the following ARDL(mpo ;my;mqo) specication
pot + ept = cp +
mpoX
`=1
`
 
pot ` + ept `

+
myX
`=1
`yt ` +
mqoX
`=1
`q
o
t ` + u
o
t ; (32)
with the associated error-correction representation
 (pot + ept) = cp + po
 
pot 1 + ept 1

+ yyt 1 + qoqot 1 (33)
+
mpo 1X
`=1
 po;`
 
pot ` + ept `

+
my 1X
`=1
 y;`yt ` +
mqo 1X
`=1
 qo;`q
o
t ` + u
o
t ;
where the level coe¢ cients, po, y, and qo, are given by
po = 1 
mpoX
`=1
`, y =
myX
`=1
`, and qo =
mqoX
`=1
`; (34)
and the coe¢ cients of lagged changes,  po;`,  y;`, and  qo;` can be readily obtained form
the parameters of the ARDL specication. Also noting from (18) that (assuming the level
coe¢ cients are non-zero)
y
po
=
 
1 
mpoX
`=1
`
! 1 myX
`=1
`; and
1
po
=  
 
1 
mpoX
`=1
`
! 1 mqoX
`=1
`;
9Quarterly oil production series (in thousand barrels per day) were obtained from the U.S. Energy Infor-
mation Administration International Energy Statistics.
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the long-run price, po, and income, y, elasticities can be computed by
po =  
 mqoX
`=1
`
! 1 
1 
mpoX
`=1
`
!
, and y =  
 mqoX
`=1
`
! 1 myX
`=1
`: (35)
We estimated (32) using quarterly observations over the period 1979Q2 to 2013Q1. We
selected the lag orders by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) using the maximum lag
orders, mmaxpo = m
max
y = m
max
qo = 4. The AIC selected the lag orders (4,1,1). The same lag
orders were also selected by the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion. The estimates for the selected
lag orders are given in column 2 of Table 4, and show that all estimated coe¢ cients have
the correct signs and are statistically signicant at the 1% level (except for b4 and b1 which
are statistically signicant at the 5% level). Using these estimates in (35), we obtain ^po =
 0:238 (0:048) and ^y = 0:616 (0:062), with the standard errors in brackets. Overall the
results seem quite satisfactory, except for the fact that using the bound testing approach
advanced in Pesaran et al. (2001) we cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no long run
(or level) relationship between (pot + ept), yt and q
o
t , which sheds doubt on the validity of the
price equation as an equilibrating mechanism. According to the bounding testing approach
the F -statistic for testing the joint signicance of the level coe¢ cients (dened by (34)),
H0 : po = y = qo = 0, is equal to 3:75 which is below the 95% lower bound critical value
of the test at 3:95, and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. This result could not be
over-turned by changing the dynamics of the price equation. However, given the special role
played by US dollar oil prices in international markets we decided to focus on a relation
between pot , yt and q
o
t , in e¤ect dropping the real exchange rate component, ept, from the
oil price equation. Interestingly, we found that now the existence of a long-run relationship
between pot , yt and q
o
t cannot be rejected. In fact, we obtained an F -statistic of 5:01 which
is above the 95% upper bound critical value of the test at 4:95 (see column 3 of Table 4).
In view of the ndings above, from now on we focus on the estimates of the oil price
equation in pot , yt and q
o
t . For this specication we obtained long-run price and income
elasticities of  0:212 (0:031) and 0:727 (0:055) ; respectively (see column 3 of Table 4).
Both estimates are statistically signicant at the one percent level and generally fall in
the range of the estimates obtained in the literature. For instance, Pesaran et al. (1998)
nd a price elasticity of between 0:0 to  0:48 for Asian countries, Gately and Huntington
(2002) report elasticities between  0:12 to  0:64 for both OECD and non-OECD countries,
Krichene (2006) obtains estimates of between  0:03 to  0:08 for various countries, Kilian
and Murphy (2014) report a price elasticity of  0:26, and Baumeister and Peersman (2013a)
obtain time-varying price elasticities in the range of  0:06 to  0:55. Moreover, although our
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Table 4: Estimates of the Oil Price Equation
Dependant Variable pot + ept p
o
t
Countries 34 Countries 34 Countries 34 Countries 35 Countries
including Russia
Estimation Period 1980Q2-2013Q1 1980Q2-2013Q1 1994Q2-2013Q1 1994Q2-2013Q1
(a) ARDL Estimates
b1 1:187 1:185 1:172 1:187
(0:088) (0:088) (0:117) (0:118)
b2  0:592  0:631  0:711  0:717
(0:131) (0:132) (0:176) (0:178)
b3 0:478 0:460 0:450 0:446
(0:131) (0:131) (0:176) (0:178)
b4  0:222  0:199  0:275  0:258
(0:088) (0:087) (0:114) (0:115)
b1 0:385 0:635 1:189 1:207
(0:134) (0:178) (0:286) (0:314)
b1  0:625  0:873  1:394  1:144
(0:249) (0:280) (0:548) (0:576)
(b) Long-run income (by) and price (bpo) elasticities
by 0:616 0:727 0:853 1:055
(0:062) (0:055) (0:274) (0:414)
bpo  0:238  0:212  0:262  0:300
(0:048) (0:031) (0:085) (0:130)
(c) Testing for the existence of level (or a long-run) relationship amongst the three variables
F -statistic 3:75 5:01 5:45 4:72
95% Upper Bound 4:95 4:95 5:00 5:00
90% Upper Bound 4:19 4:19 4:23 4:23
Notes: The estimates reported under column 2 are based on the ARDL model pot + ept = cp +P4
`=1 `
 
pot ` + ept `

+ 1yt 1 + 1q
o
t 1 + u
o
t , those under columns 35 are based on p
o
t = cp +P4
`=1 `p
o
t ` + 1yt 1 + 1q
o
t 1 + u
o
t ; where ept =
PN
i=1 wi ln (Eit=CPIit), q
o
t =
P
i w
o
i ln (Q
o
it), p
o
t = ln(P
o
t ),
yt =
PN
i=1 wi ln(GDPit); Eit is the US dollar exchange rate, CPIit is the consumer price index, Q
o
it is oil
production, P ot is the oil price measured by the price of Brent crude oil in US dollar, GDPit is the real GDP
of country i at time t, i = 1; 2; :::N; wi is the PPP-GDP weight of country i; and woi is set to 1=n for the
n major oil producers and zero otherwise. n = 10 for the estimates under columns 24 and n = 11 for the
estimates under column 5. See Table 1 for the list of the countries covered. An intercept is included in all
regressions but not shown. Standard errors are presented below the corresponding coe¢ cients in brackets.
Symbols ** and * denote signicance at 1% and 5%, respectively.
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estimate for the income elasticity of demand (0:727) is lower than that reported in Pesaran
et al. (1998) for Asian developing countries (1:0   1:2), it is in line with the estimates of
between 0:53 to 0:95 and 0:54 to 0:90 in Gately and Huntington (2002) and Krichene (2006),
respectively.10 Furthermore, in a recent study, Mohaddes (2013), using annual data between
1965 and 2009 for 65 major oil consumers, estimates dynamic heterogeneous panel data
models with interactive e¤ects and nds a price elasticity of  0:15 and an income elasticity
of 0:68, which are close to the elasticities reported in Table 4.
4.1.1 Robustness to the inclusion of Russia
As explained earlier we do not include Russia in our sample due to lack of su¢ ciently long
time series data on this countrys macro variables such as real GDP, ination, and the
exchange rate. Having data over a su¢ ciently long time period is important when it comes
to estimating the GVAR-Oil model, and including Russia would have meant estimating the
country-specic VARX* models using 76 quarterly observations rather than 132, making
the results much less reliable. However, given that Russia is the third largest oil producer
in the world (after Saudi Arabia and the U.S.) we thought it important that we check the
robustness of the estimates of the oil price equation reported under column 3 of Table 4
to the exclusion of Russia from our analysis. To this end we used quarterly GDP data for
Russia from 1993Q1 to 2013Q1 from the IMF International Financial Statistics and updated
the PPP GDP weights using the World Bank World Development Indicator database so as
to calculate world income (yt) inclusive of Russia. We also included Russian oil production
in the global oil supply variable (qot ), using quarterly Russian oil production series from the
U.S. Energy Information Administration International Energy Statistics.
The ARDL estimates of the oil price equation with Russia included (35 countries with
11 major oil producers) are reported in the last column of Table 4, from which we observe
that the estimates of the short-run coe¢ cients (bi, for i = 1; 2; 3; 4, b1, and b1) are all
statistically signicant and that, as before, we cannot reject the existence of a long-run
relationship relating oil prices to oil supplies and world real income, although the signicance
is now at the lower level of 90%. We notice that the long-run price and income elasticities
of demand, although still in line with that of the literature, are larger than the estimates
based on a substantially longer sample period (56 more observations) but excluding Russia
(column 3 of Table 4), however, the standard errors of the estimates are quite a bit larger.
To compare the estimates with and without Russia but using the same sample period we
re-estimate the oil price equation for the original 34 countries but using data over the shorter
10See also Fattouh (2007) for an extensive survey of the literature on income and price elasticities of
demand for energy.
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period 1994Q2-2013Q1. These results are reported under column 4 of Table 4, and show
that (i) the elasticities of demand and their standard errors are somewhat larger when the
sample period is shorter and (ii) the elasticities and their standard errors are smaller when
Russia is not included in the sample. Overall, it seems that the inclusion of Russia, while
increasing the estimated long-run elasticities of demand, yields substantially larger standard
errors (compare the last two columns of Table 4). The larger price and income elasticities
obtained when Russia is included must therefore be balanced by the fact that the estimates
are much less precisely estimated and have a greater margin of errors as compared to the
elasticity estimates obtained using the longer sample period excluding Russia. We, therefore,
feel justied in proceeding with the longer sample period even though this means that Russia
must be excluded from our analysis.
4.2 Estimates of the country-specic VARX* models
While our analysis covers 34 countries, in the construction of the GVAR-Oil model we create
a block comprising 8 of the 11 countries that initially joined the euro area on January 1,
1999, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain.
The time series data for the euro area are constructed as cross-sectionally weighted averages
of the variables of the eight euro area countries, using Purchasing Power Parity GDP weights,
averaged over the 2007-2009 period (see Table 3). Thus, as displayed in Table 1, the GVAR-
Oil model includes one region and 26 country-specic VARX* models. For various data
sources used to build the quarterly GVAR-Oil dataset, covering 1979Q2 to 2013Q1, and for
the construction of the variables see Appendix A. For brevity, we provide evidence for the
weak exogeneity assumption of the foreign variables and discuss the issue of structural breaks
in the context of our GVAR-Oil model in Appendix B.
4.2.1 Specication of the country-specic VARX* models
In our application each country-specic model has a maximum of six endogenous variables.
Using the same terminology as in equation (25), the ki1 vector of country-specic endoge-
nous variables is dened as xit =
 
qoit; yit; it; epit; r
S
it; r
L
it;
0
, where qoit is the log of oil
production at time t for country i, yit is the log of real Gross Domestic Product, it is the
rate of ination, epit is the log deated exchange rate, and rSit
 
rLit

is the short (long) term
interest rate, if country i is a major oil producer, otherwise xit =
 
yit; it; epit; r
S
it; r
L
it;
0
.11
The model for the U.S. di¤ers from the rest in two respects: given the importance of U.S.
11Note that long term interest rates are not available for all countries, and short term and long term
interest rates are not available in the case of Iran and Saudi Arabia.
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nancial variables in the global economy, the log of world real equity prices, eqt is included
in the U.S. model as an endogenous variable, and as weakly exogenous in the other country
models (eqit = eqt), whilst U.S. dollar exchange rates are included as endogenous variables
in all models except for the United States.12 The endogenous variables of the U.S. model
are therefore given by xUS;t =
 
eqt; q
o
US;t; yUS;t; US;t; r
S
US;t; r
L
US;t
0
:
In the case of all countries, except for the U.S. and euro area, the foreign variables
included in the country-specic models, computed as in equation (26), are given by xit = 
eqit; y

it; 

it; ep

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it
0
. The trade weights are computed as three-year averages over
2007-2009.13
Table 5: Variables Specication of the Country-specic VARX* Models
Oil Producers Remaining 17
The U.S. Model (except U.S.) VARX* Models
Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign
yit y

it yit y

it yit y

it
it   it it it it
  epit epit   epit  
rSit   rSit rSit rSit rSit
rLit   rLit rLit rLit rLit
qoit;s   qoit;s      
eqt     eqt   eqt
  pot   pot   pot
We excluded the foreign ination variable, EA;t, from the euro model since, based on
some preliminary tests, we could not maintain that EA;t is weakly exogenous. Also, given
the pivotal role played by the U.S. in global nancial markets, we excluded the foreign
interest rates, rSUS;t and r
L
US;t, from the U.S. model. The exclusion of these variables from
the U.S. model was also supported by preliminary test results showing that rSUS;t and r
L
US;t
cannot be assumed to be weakly exogenous when included in the U.S. model. A similar
result was found when the foreign ination variable, US;t, was included in the U.S. model.
In short, the U.S. model includes only two foreign variables, namely xUS;t = (y

US;t; ep

US;t)
0;
where epUS;t =
PN
j=1wUSA;j(ejt   pjt); wUSA;j is the share of U.S. trade with country j, ejt
is the log of US dollar exchange rate with respect to the currency of country j, and pjt is
12Note that the inclusion of the equity price variable in the U.S. model is supported by empirical evidence
that shows that there is a global nancial cycle in capital ows, asset prices, and credit growth, and that
cycle is mainly driven by monetary policy settings of the United States, a¤ecting leverage of international
banks, and cross-border capital/credit ows. See, for instance, Rey (2013).
13A similar approach has also been followed in the case of Global VAR models estimated in the literature.
See, for example, Dees et al. (2007) and Cashin et al. (2015).
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the log CPI price index of country j. The three di¤erent sets of individual country-specic
models are summarized in Table 5.
4.2.2 Lag order selection, cointegrating relations, and persistence proles
We use quarterly observations over the period 1979Q22013Q1, across the di¤erent spec-
ications in Table 5, to estimate the 27 country-specic VARX*(si; si ) models separately.
We select the lag orders of the domestic and foreign variables, si and si , by the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) applied to the underlying unrestricted VARX* models, with
the maximum lag orders set to 2, in view of the limited number of time series observations
available. The selected lag orders are reported in Table 6.
Table 6: Lag Orders of the Country-specic VARX*(s, s*) Models together with
the Number of Cointegrating Relations (r)
VARX* Order Cointegrating VARX* Order Cointegrating
Country s^i s^i relations (r^i) Country s^i s^

i relations (r^i)
Argentina 2 2 2 Norway 2 1 2
Australia 1 1 2 New Zealand 2 2 2
Brazil 1 2 2 Peru 2 2 2
Canada 1 2 3 Philippines 2 1 2
China 2 1 2 South Africa 2 1 1
Chile 2 1 2 Saudi Arabia 2 1 1
Euro Area 2 1 2 Singapore 1 1 2
India 2 2 1 Sweden 2 1 2
Indonesia 2 1 3 Switzerland 2 1 2
Iran 2 1 1 Thailand 2 1 2
Japan 2 2 3 Turkey 2 2 1
Korea 2 2 4 UK 1 1 2
Malaysia 1 1 1 USA 2 1 3
Mexico 1 2 3
Notes: s^i and s^i denote the estimated lag orders for the domestic and foreign variables, respectively, selected
by the Akaike Information Criterion, with the maximum lag orders set to 2. The number of cointegrating
relations (r^i) are selected using the trace test statistics based on the 95% critical values from MacKinnon
(1991) for all countries except for Norway, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and the UK, for which we reduced
ri below that suggested by the trace statistic to ensure the stability of the global model.
Having established the lag orders, we proceed to determine the number of long-run re-
lations. Cointegration tests with the null hypothesis of no cointegration, one cointegrating
relation, and so on are carried out using Johansens maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics
as developed in Pesaran et al. (2000) for models with weakly exogenous I (1) regressors,
unrestricted intercepts and restricted trend coe¢ cients. We choose the number of cointe-
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grating relations (ri) based on the trace test statistics, given that it has better small sample
properties than the maximal eigenvalue test, using the 95% critical values from MacKinnon
(1991).
Figure 1: Persistence Proles of the E¤ect of a System-wide Shock to the Coin-
tegrating Relations
(a) All Countries
(b) Iran (c) Saudi Arabia
Notes: Figures show median e¤ects of a system-wide shock to the cointegrating relations with 95% boot-
strapped condence bounds for Iran and Saudi Arabia.
It is now important to investigate the dynamic properties of the GVAR-Oil model when
the 27 individual country models are combined with the oil price equation. In the GVAR
literature this is done by examining the persistence proles (PPs) of the e¤ects of system
wide shocks developed in Lee and Pesaran (1993) and Pesaran and Shin (1996). On impact
the PPs are normalized to take the value of unity, but the rate at which they tend to
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zero provides information on the speed with which equilibrium correction takes place in
response to shocks. The PPs could initially over-shoot, thus exceeding unity, but must
eventually tend to zero if the relationship under consideration is indeed cointegrated. In
our preliminary analysis of the PPs for the full GVAR-Oil model we notice that, in the
case of a few of the countries, the speed of convergence was rather slow. In particular, the
speed of adjustment was very slow for Norway, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and the UK.
This may be due to the fact that the number of cointegrating relations are estimated at
the level of individual countries (conditional on the foreign variables), whilst the PPs are
computed using the GVAR-Oil model as a whole, which tends to have fewer cointegrating
relations as compared to the number of cointegrating relations identied at the individual
country levels. To address this issue we reduced the number of cointegrating relations for
these economies, and ended up with 55 cointegrating relations as reported in Table 6. The
associated persistence proles are shown in Figure 1a, from which we see that the proles
overshoot for six of the 55 cointegrating vectors before quickly tending to zero. The half-life
of the shocks is generally less than 5 quarters and speed of convergence is relatively fast.
Focusing on the persistence proles for Iran and Saudi Arabia we plot these PPs together
with their 95% bootstrapped error bands in Figures 1b and 1c. For these two major oil
exporters we notice that the speed of convergence is very fast, which is in line with those
reported for oil exporters in the literature. See Esfahani et al. (2013, 2014) who also argue
that the faster speeds of adjustment towards equilibrium experienced by some of the major
oil exporters could be due to the relatively underdeveloped nature of money and capital
markets in these economies.
5 Counterfactual analysis of oil supply shocks
With the GVAR-Oil model fully specied and shown to have a number of desirable statistical
properties, see the detailed discussion above and in Appendix B, we can now consider the
e¤ects of country-specic supply disruptions. As illustrated in Section 2, the disaggregated
nature of the model allows us to identify country-specic oil supply shocks and answer coun-
terfactual questions regarding the possible macroeconomic e¤ects of oil supply disruptions
on the global economy. Our proposed scheme for identication of country-specic supply
shocks is based on the assumption that changes in individual country oil production are
unimportant relative to changes in the world oil supplies, and as a result the correlation of
oil prices and country-specic oil supply shocks tend to zero for su¢ ciently large number of
oil producers. Although we show that such an identication procedure is applicable even if
the country-specic oil supply shocks are weakly correlated, in the sense dened by Chudik
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et al. (2011). Our approach to identication of oil supply shocks di¤er from the literature
which considers identication of global supply shocks, rather than shocks originating from a
specic country or a region, typically by imposing sign restrictions on the structural parame-
ters of a three equation VAR model in oil prices, world real output, and global oil production
(see, for instance, Kilian and Murphy 2012, Baumeister and Peersman 2013b, and Cashin
et al. 2014).
Dealing with country-specic shocks raises a new issue which is absent from the global
oil supply and demand analysis; namely, we need to make some assumptions about the likely
contemporaneous responses of other oil producers to the shock. Di¤erent counterfactual
scenarios for such responses can be considered. One possibility would be to assume zero
contemporaneous supply responses, and allow the e¤ects of the shock to work through oil
price changes and secondary lagged feedback e¤ects. Alternatively, one can use historically
estimated covariances of the oil supply shocks. To allow for the possible cross-country oil
supply spillover e¤ects we make use of the structural generalized impulse response functions
based on historically estimated covariances of the country-specic oil supply shocks. See the
theoretical analysis of Section 3.1, and the generalized impulse response functions given by
(30) and (31).
5.1 An adverse shock to Iranian oil supply
We rst consider the oil price and production e¤ects of a negative unit shock (equal to
one-standard-error) to Iranian oil supply. The associated structural impulse responses to-
gether with their 95% error bands are given in Figure 2. This gure clearly shows that,
following the supply shock, Iranian production temporarily falls by around 16% in the rst
four quarters (equivalent to 0:64 mbd), and the output e¤ects remain statistically signicant
for six quarters. Reacting to the loss in Irans oil output and to stabilize the oil markets,
other OPEC producers (Indonesia and Saudi Arabia in particular) increase their production.
Saudi Arabian production initially increases by 8% and eventually by 13% per annum in the
long run. As a result, oil prices rise by 2% (being statistically signicant in the rst four
quarters), but in the long run they fall back by 5:4% per annum. The fall in oil prices in
the long run is due to the persistent nature of oil output from Saudi Arabia, with the rise in
Saudi oil production being maintained at a higher level following the shock. As far as supply
responses by other oil producers, we cannot nd any statistically signicant impact arising
from the adverse shock to Irans oil supply.
The evolution of Iranian and Saudi Arabian oil production (in mbd) over the 1978-2013
period is displayed in Figure 3, and clearly shows two distinct periods of large reduction
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Figure 2: Structural Impulse Responses of a Negative Unit Shock to Iranian Oil
Supply
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in Iranian oil supply,
with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
Figure 3: Iranian and Saudi Arabian Oil Production in Million Barrels per Day,
1978-2013
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Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration International Energy Statistics.
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Figure 4: Structural Impulse Responses of a Negative Unit Shock to Iranian Oil
Supply
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in Iranian oil supply,
with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
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in Iranian oil output: the rst one coincides with the Iranian revolution and its aftermath,
namely the period 1978/79-1981, and the second one starts mid-2011 and coincides with
the intensication of sanctions against Iran. In the rst period, although the revolutionary
upheavals and the strikes by oil workers halted Iranian oil production in 1978/79, it was a
conscious decision by the Provisional Iranian Government to reduce the level of oil production
to around 30 percent below its average level over the 1971-78 period (Mohaddes and Pesaran
2014). However, as it turned out, the invasion of Iran by Iraq in 1980, reduced oil production
and rening capacity signicantly and actual production dropped from around 6 mbd in 1978
to averaging around 2.1 mbd during the 1980s. What is interesting is that Figure 3 shows
that the fall of Iranian supply was initially somewhat compensated for by Saudi Arabia,
which increased its production by 1.6 mbd between 1978-1981.
The second major Iranian supply shock was due to a series of sanctions on Iran initiated
by the U.S. in 2011 and followed by the European Union in 2012, which included (i) penalties
on companies involved in Irans upstream activities and petrochemical industry, followed by
(ii) sanctions on Irans Central Bank, to (iii) ending of nancial transaction services to
Iranian banks, and (iv) eventually a complete embargo on import of Iranian oil, to name
a few.14 The result of these comprehensive oil (and nancial) sanctions was a signicant
reduction in Iranian oil production and exports. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration Iranian oil production between June 2011 and June 2014 had fallen by 875
thousand barrels per day. What is most interesting is that during the same period Saudi
Arabian production had increased by 865 thousand barrels per day. Therefore, there is
a clear compensating movement in Saudi oil output, when Irans oil output falls by large
amounts due to political factors. This is only possible given Saudi Arabias position as a
global swing producer, in line with what is shown in Figure 2. But note that outside these
two episodes (1978/79-1981 and 2011 onwards) Iranian production remains fairly stable with
the Saudi oil output being quite volatile.
Turning to the GDP e¤ects following an Iranian oil supply shock, we notice that Iranian
real output falls by 6% per annum in the short-run and 3:5% in the long run, see Figure 4.
This fall is due mainly to lower production in the short run and lower oil prices in the long
run, which in turn reduces Iranian oil income. It is worth noting that the ratio of Iranian
oil export revenues to real output and total exports is around 22% and 70%, respectively,
with these ratios having been maintained over the last three decades. See, for instance,
Mohaddes and Pesaran (2014). However, for Saudi Arabia the fall in oil prices is more than
compensated by the increase in Saudi oil production; as a result real output increases by
3:1% in the long run. Interestingly, for most of the other countries the median output e¤ects
14See Habibi (2014) for more details about the history of specic sanctions on Iran.
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are positive suggesting that the fall in oil prices has helped boost real output, although these
responses are statistically insignicant. Therefore, overall our results seem to suggest that
an adverse shock to Iranian oil supply is neutralized in terms of its e¤ects on the global
economy by a compensating increase in the Saudi oil production. As we have noted, this is
largely borne out by the recent episode of intensication of oil sanctions against Iran.
5.2 An adverse shock to Saudi Arabian oil supply
Figure 5 displays the plots of structural impulse responses for the e¤ects of a negative Saudi
Arabian supply shock on oil prices as well as on global oil supply. It can be seen that
Saudi production falls by 11% per quarter in the long run, although in the short-run both
Iranian and Norwegian oil production increases by 4% and 2% per annum, respectively. But
considering that all major producers except for Saudi Arabia are producing at or close to
capacity, the fall in Saudi supply is not compensated for by the other producers in the long
run. As a result oil prices increase by 22%, and global equity markets fall by 9% in the
long-run (with both e¤ects being statistically signicant). This large oil price e¤ect is not
surprising and even larger e¤ects have been documented following Saudi decisions to make
large changes in their production. For instance, in September 1985, Saudi production was
increased from 2 mbd to 4.7 mbd, causing oil prices to drop from $59:67 to $30:67 in real
terms.
The e¤ects of the negative shock to Saudi Arabian oil production on real output of the
26 countries and the euro area are shown in Figure 6. Not surprisingly, given that the
increase in oil prices does not fully o¤set the fall in oil income due to the lower Saudi oil
production, we have a negative e¤ect on Saudi Arabian real output, which falls by 10% in
the long-run (Saudi oil export revenue to GDP ratio is around 40%). On the other hand,
Iranian real GDP increases by 2% in the short-run (being statistically signicant for the rst
ve quarters) as Iranian oil production increases in the short term (see Figure 5). Turning
to the (net) oil importers we notice from Figure 6 that almost all median e¤ects are negative
and more importantly signicant for the following countries: Argentina ( 2:9%), Australia
( 0:6%), Chile ( 1:6%), Korea ( 1:6%), Malaysia ( 1:7%), the U.K. ( 1:0%), and the U.S.
( 0:7%), with the median annualized e¤ects in the 16th quarter reported in the brackets.
Therefore, in contrast to the Iranian case, any major cutbacks to Saudi oil production are
likely to have signicant ramications on the global economy, adversely a¤ecting real output
and equity prices worldwide.
30
Figure 5: Structural Impulse Responses of a Negative Unit Shock to Saudi
Arabian Oil Supply
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in Saudi Arabian oil
supply, with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
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Figure 6: Structural Impulse Responses of a Negative Unit Shock to Saudi
Arabian Oil Supply
Notes: Figures show median impulse responses to a one-standard-deviation decrease in Saudi Arabian oil
supply, with 95 percent bootstrapped condence bounds. The horizon is quarterly.
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6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we developed a quarterly model for oil markets, taking into account both
global supply and demand conditions, which was then integrated within a compact multi-
country model of the global economy utilizing the GVAR framework, creating a regionally
disaggregated model of oil supply and demand. Oil supplies were determined in country-
specic models conditional on oil prices, with oil prices determined globally in terms of
aggregate oil supplies and world income. The combined model, referred to as the GVAR-Oil
model, was estimated using quarterly observations over the period 1979Q2-2013Q1 for 27
countries (with the euro area treated as a single economy), and tested for the key assumptions
of weak exogeneity of global and country-specic foreign variables, and parameter stability.
The statistical evidence provided in the appendix supports these assumptions and shows
that only 11 out of the 158 tests of weak exogeneity that were carried out were statistically
signicant at the 5% level. Also, most regression coe¢ cients turned out to be stable, although
we found important evidence of instability in error variances which is in line with the well
documented evidence on "great moderation" in the United States. To deal with changing
error variances we used bootstrapping techniques to compute condence bounds for the
impulse responses that we report.
This paper contributes to the literature both in terms of the way we model oil prices and
in the new approach used to identify country-specic oil supply shocks within a multi-country
framework, which contrasts with the literatures focus on the analysis of global shocks. In
this way we have been able to address important questions regarding the macroeconomic
implications of oil supply disruptions (due to sanctions, wars or natural disasters) for the
world economy on a country-by-country basis.
Our results indicate that the global economic implications of oil supply shocks vary
substantially depending on which country is subject to the shock. In particular, our ndings
suggest that following a negative shock to Iranian oil supply, Saudi Arabian oil output
increases so as to compensate for the loss in OPEC exports and to stabilize the oil markets.
This is possible as Saudi Arabia has considerable spare capacity and is often seen as a global
swing producer. As a result, mainly due to Irans lower oil income, we observe a fall in
Iranian real output by 6% in the short-run which then rebounds somewhat to end up 3:5%
below its level before the shock. For Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, the fall in oil prices is
more than compensated for by the increase in Saudi oil production, and as a result Saudi real
output increases by 3:1% in the long run. Given the increase in Saudi Arabian oil production,
overall, a negative shock to Iranian oil supply is neutralized in terms of its e¤ects on the
global economy.
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In contrast the macroeconomic consequences of an adverse shock to Saudi Arabian oil
production are very di¤erent from those of an Iranian oil supply shock. Given that most
of the other oil producers are producing at (or near) capacity, they cannot increase their
production to compensate for a loss in Saudi Arabian supply. We therefore observe an
immediate and permanent increase in oil prices by 22% in the long run. As a result, such
a supply shock has signicant e¤ects for the global economy in terms of real output, which
falls in both advanced (including the U.K. and the U.S.) and emerging economies, and also
in terms of nancial markets as global equity markets fall by 9% in the long run.
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A Data appendix
A.1 Data sources
The main data source used to estimate the GVAR-Oil model is Smith and Galesi (2014),
which provides quarterly observations for the majority of the variables covering the period
1979Q2-2013Q1. We augment this database with quarterly observations for Iran and for
oil production. Data on consumer price index, GDP, and the exchange rate for Iran for
the period 1979Q1-2006Q4 are from Esfahani et al. (2014). These series are updated using
the Central Bank of Irans (CBI) online database as well as several volumes of the CBIs
Economic Report and Balance Sheets and Monthly CPI Workbook. The Iranian GDP data
were updated using the International Monetary Funds (IMF) International Financial Sta-
tistics and World Economic Outlook databases, while the exchange rate data are from the
IMF International Financial Statistics (for the o¢ cial exchange rate) and IMF INS data-
base (for the "free market" rate).15 Finally, we obtain quarterly oil production series (in
thousand barrels per day) from the U.S. Energy Information Administration International
Energy Statistics.16
A.2 Construction of the variables
Log real GDP, yit, the rate of ination, it, short-term interest rate, rSit, long-term interest
rate, rLit, the log deated exchange rate, epit, and log real equity prices, eqit, are six variables
included in our model, as well as most of the GVAR applications in the literature. These six
variables are constructed as
yit = ln(GDPit); it = pit   pit 1; pit = ln(CPIit); epit = ln (Eit=CPIit) ;
rSit = 0:25 ln(1 +R
S
it=100); r
L
it = 0:25 ln(1 +R
L
it=100); eqit = ln (EQit=CPIit) ; (36)
where GDPit is the real Gross Domestic Product at time t for country i, CPIit is the
consumer price index, Eit is the nominal exchange rate in terms of US dollar, EQit is the
nominal Equity Price Index, and RSit and R
L
it are short-term and long-term interest rates,
respectively. In addition to the above variables we also include the log of oil prices, pot , and
the log of oil production, qoit in our dataset.
15Data on the "free market" rate are only available from the IMF between 1979Q1 to 2011Q3. We therefore
make use of data from online traders, such as Eranico: www.eranico.com, to complete the series until 2013Q1.
16These data are only available from 1994Q1, so quarterly series from 1979Q2 to 1993Q4 were linearly
interpolated (backward) using annual series. For a description of the interpolation procedure see Section 1.1
of Supplement A of Dees et al. (2007).
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For Iran only, as in Esfahani et al. (2013), we construct epit as a geometrically weighted
average of the log of the free (eIran;t) and the o¢ cial rates (eIranOF;t)
eIran;;t = eIran;t + (1  )eIranOF;t; (37)
where  represents the proportion of imports by public and private agencies that are traded
at the free market rate, on average. There is little hard evidence on  although, due to
the gradual attempts at currency unication, it is reasonable to expect  to have risen over
time. Initially we set  = 0:70, but smaller values of  = 0:65 and 0:60 resulted in very
similar estimates and test outcomes. We, therefore, only report the results using eIran;;t
with  = 0:70.
Table 7: PPP-GDP Weights and Global Equity Weights (in percent), averages
over 20072009
Country PPP GDP Global Equity Country PPP GDP Global Equity
Weights (wi) Weights (w
eq
i ) Weights (wi) Weights (w
eq
i )
Argentina 0.99 1.03 Norway 0.48 0.50
Australia 1.42 1.48 New Zealand 0.22 0.23
Brazil 3.44   Peru 0.42  
Canada 2.25 2.33 Philippines 0.55 0.58
China 14.49   South Africa 0.88 0.91
Chile 0.42 0.44 Saudi Arabia 1.02  
Euro Area 17.86 18.56 Singapore 0.44 0.46
India 6.15 6.39 Sweden 0.62 0.65
Indonesia 1.60   Switzerland 0.60 0.62
Iran 1.43   Thailand 0.95 0.98
Japan 7.47 7.76 Turkey 1.79  
Korea 2.28 2.37 UK 3.87 4.02
Malaysia 0.67 0.69 USA 24.93 50.00
Mexico 2.75  
Notes: The euro area block includes 8 of the 11 countries that initially joined the euro on January 1, 1999:
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. Source: World Bank World
Development Indicators, 2007-2009.
The world equity prices, eqt, are computed as a weighted average of country-specic
equity indices (when available), namely
eqt =
NX
i=1
weqi eqit; with
NX
i=1
weqi = 1; (38)
where weqi  0 measures the importance of each countrys equity market in the global
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economy. The weight weqi is set to zero in the case of countries without substantial equity
markets. For countries with important equity markets one possibility would be to use PPP-
GDP weights. But using such weights would understate the importance of the U.S. in the
world equity markets which is much more substantial than the 25% PPP-GDP weight of
the United States in the world economy (see Table 7). Therefore, to reect the relative
importance of U.S. nancial markets we set weqUS = 0:50 and allocate the remaining 50% of
the weights to the remaining countries using PPP-GDP weights. The resultant weights, weqi ,
are summarized in Table 7.
A.3 Trade weights
The trade weights, wij, used to calculate the ve foreign variables
 
yit; 

it; ep

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it

,
are based on data from the International Monetary Funds Direction of Trade Statistics
database, and are given in the 27  27 matrix provided in Table 8. Based on 2007-2009
averages, the most important trading partner for Iran is the euro area, which accounts for
25% of total Iranian trade. Trade with China, India, and Korea (being 19%, 9%, and 12%
respectively) has increased signicantly over the past two decades, emphasising the shift
in Iranian trade from the west to the east. In fact more than 57% of Irans trade is with
Asian countries, although this number has probably increased substantially following the
2011 U.S. sanctions and the European Unionss oil and nancial sanctions on Iran in 2012.
Other countries in our sample with whom Irans total trade is more than 5% are Japan
(14%) and Turkey (7%), with the number in brackets being the trade shares. Comparing
Saudi Arabia and Iran we see from Table 8 that although Saudi Arabias trade with China
(12%), the euro area (16%), Japan (16%), and Korea (10%) are substantial, Saudi trade is
generally less concentrated on Asia and Europe with, for instance, the U.S. (19%) being the
major trading partner.
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B Country-specic estimates and tests
The estimation of individual VARX*(si; si ) models is conducted under the assumption that
the country-specic foreign and common variables are weakly exogenous and that the para-
meters of the models are stable over time. As both assumptions are needed for the construc-
tion and the implementation of the GVAR-Oil model, we will test and provide evidence for
these assumptions in Sections B.2 and B.3
B.1 Unit root tests
For the interpretation of the long-run relations, and also to ensure that we do not work with
a mixture of I(1) and I(2) variables, we need to consider the unit root properties of the core
variables in our country-specic models (see Table 5). We apply Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF) unit root tests, as well as the weighted symmetric ADF tests (ADF-WS) proposed by
Park and Fuller (1995), to the level and rst di¤erences of all the variables in the GVAR-Oil
model.17 The ADF-WS tests are included as they are shown to be more powerful than the
standard ADF tests in some applications. Overall, the unit root test results support the
treatment of the variables in our model as being approximately I(1). For brevity, these test
results are not reported here but are available upon request.
B.2 Testing the weak exogeneity assumption
Weak exogeneity of country-specic foreign variables, xit =
 
yit; 

it; ep

it; r
S
it ; r
L
it
0
, and
the common variables, poilt and eqt, with respect to the long-run parameters of the conditional
model is vital in the construction and the implementation of the GVAR-Oil model. We
formally test this assumption following the procedure in Johansen (1992) and Harbo et al.
(1998). Thus, we rst estimate the 27 VARX*(si; si ) models separately under the assumption
that the foreign and common variables are weakly exogenous and then run the following
regression for each lth element of xit
xit;l = il +
riX
j=1
ij;l\ECM ij;t 1 +
piX
n=1
'
0
ik;lxi;t k +
qiX
m=1
#im;lexi;t m + "it;l; (39)
where \ECM ij;t 1, j = 1; 2; :::; ri, are the estimated error correction terms corresponding to
the ri cointegrating relations found for the ith country model, pi and q

i are the orders of the
17All estimations and test results are obtained using the GVAR Toolbox 2.0. For further technical details
see Smith and Galesi (2014).
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lag changes for the domestic and foreign variables, and exit =  x0it ; epit;poilt ;eqt0.18
Under the null hypothesis that the variables are weakly exogenous, the error correction term
must not be signicant; therefore, the formal test for weak exogeneity is an F -test of the
joint hypothesis that ij;l = 0 for each j = 1; 2; :::; ri in equation (39).
Table 9: F-Statistics for Testing the Weak Exogeneity of the Country-Specic
Foreign Variables and Oil Prices
Notes: * denotes statistical signicance at the 5% level.
The test results together with the 95% critical values are reported in Table 9, from which
we see that the weak exogeneity assumption cannot be rejected for the overwhelming majority
of the variables considered. In fact, only 11 out of 158 exogeneity tests turned out to be
statistically signicant at the 5% level. Considering the signicance level assumed here, even
if the weak exogeneity assumption is always valid, we would expect up to 8 rejections, 5% of
18Note that the models for U.S. and other oil producers are specied di¤erently as is the model for the
euro area. See the discussion in Section 4.2.
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the 158 tests. Therefore, overall, the available evidence in Table 9 supports our treatment
of the foreign and global variables in the individual VARX* models as weakly exogenous.
B.3 Tests of structural breaks
The possibility of structural breaks is a fundamental problem in macroeconomic modelling.
However, given that the individual VARX* models are specied conditional on the foreign
variables in xit, they are more robust to the possibility of structural breaks in compari-
son to reduced-form VARs, as the GVAR setup can readily accommodate co-breaking. See
Dees et al. (2007) for a detailed discussion. We test the null of parameter stability using
the residuals from the individual reduced-form error correction equations of the country-
specic VARX*(si; si ) models, initially looking at the maximal OLS cumulative sum sta-
tistic (PKsup) and its mean square variant (PKmsq) of Ploberger and Krämer (1992). We
also test for parameter constancy over time against non-stationary alternatives as proposed
by Nyblom (1989) (NY ), and consider sequential Wald statistics for a single break at an
unknown change point. More specically, the mean Wald statistic of Hansen (1992) (MW ),
the Wald form of the Quandt (1960) likelihood ratio statistic (QLR), and the Andrews and
Ploberger (1994) Wald statistics based on the exponential average (APW ). Finally, we also
examine the heteroskedasticity-robust versions of NY , MW , QLR, and APW:
Table 10 presents the number of rejections of the null hypothesis of parameter constancy
per variable across the country-specic models at the 5% signicance level. For brevity,
test statistics and bootstrapped critical values are not reported here but are available on
request. Overall, it seems that most regression coe¢ cients are stable, although the results
vary considerably across di¤erent tests. In the case of the two PK tests, the null hypothesis
is rejected between 13% 16% of the time. For the NY , MW , QLR; and APW tests on the
other hand, we note that the rejection rate is much larger, between 16% 53%. TheQLR and
APW rejection rates, for the joint null hypothesis of coe¢ cient and error variance stability,
are particularly high with 68 cases each out of 179 being rejected. However, looking at the
robust version of these tests, we note that the rejection rate falls considerably to between
9% and 16%. Therefore, although we nd some evidence for structural instability, it seems
that possible changes in error variances rather than parameter coe¢ cients is the main reason
for this. We deal with this issue by using bootstrapped means and condence bounds when
undertaking the impulse response analysis. Table 11 presents the break dates with the QLR
statistics at the 5% signicance level.
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Table 10: Number of Rejections of the Null of Parameter Constancy per Variable
across the Country-specic Models at the 5 percent Signicance Level
Tests y  ep rS rL qoil eq Total
PKsup 3 4 3 5 1 4 0 20(16)
PKmsq 3 3 3 4 0 4 0 17(13)
NY 1 6 7 2 3 1 0 20(16)
robust-NY 0 3 3 0 3 2 0 11(9)
QLR 11 17 10 19 7 3 1 68(53)
robust-QLR 1 6 2 3 6 2 0 20(16)
MW 7 9 10 7 7 2 1 43(34)
robust-MW 2 3 4 0 5 3 0 17(13)
APW 11 17 11 19 7 3 0 68(53)
robust-APW 1 5 3 1 6 3 0 19(15)
Notes: The test statistics PKsup and PKmsq are based on the cumulative sums of OLS residuals, NY is the
Nyblom test for time-varying parameters and QLR, MW and APW are the sequential Wald statistics for a
single break at an unknown change point. Statistics with the prex robustdenote the heteroskedasticity-
robust version of the tests. All tests are implemented at the 5% signicance level. The number in brackets
are the percentage rejection rates.
Table 11: Break Dates Computed with Quandts Likelihood Ratio Statistic
Notes: All tests are implemented at the 5% signicance level.
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